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OBSCURITY IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. *
T HE case of Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen I was a landmark in
the interpretation of the constitutional grant of federal ju-
dicial power over "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction."' During the nineteenth century the emphasis was on
delineating the boundary between state and federal spheres of
judicial competence over maritime matters. The Supreme Court
developed many of the principles of a general maritime law and
demanded its uniform application within the federal system of
admiralty courts. As late as 1893, however, state courts were not
required to apply federal maritime law to common-law proceedings
involving maritime subjects; I each jurisdiction developed, some-
what incidentally, its own system of substantive law. The Jensen
decision represented a decisive departure from that approach, in
the direction of establishing a general maritime law for both state
and federal courts on the theory that substantive law should not
be determined by the choice of forum.4
The question in Jensen was whether the widow of a longshore-
man who forgot to duck as he backed his truck into a hatchway
in the side of a docked ship could recover under the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law.5 The Supreme Court, reversing
the New York courts, held that she could not. State legislation
that "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of
the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law. A.B., Brown,
x947; LL.B., Harvard, 1952.
1 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
2 U.S. CoNsr. art. III.
s Belden v. Chase, iSo US. 674 (1893).
4 Compare ibid. with Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 4o6 (1953) (ap-
plicability of maritime rule of comparative negligence to proceedings at common
law). See Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime
Law, 64 HAv. L. REv. 246, 254 (1950).
' N.Y. Sess. Laws 1914, c. 316.
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of that law in its international and interstate relations" 6 runs
counter to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts, the majority found, and cannot be enforced even in state
tribunals.
It is clear from the opinion that the Court was primarily con-
cerned with the development of a general maritime law. But in
the ensuing years the judiciary's interest shifted towards according
the injured worker and his family adequate means of availing
themselves of the compensatory relief that is provided by federal
and state governments. The Supreme Court's attempts to recon-
cile that purpose with its earlier concern for a general maritime
law, and the consequences these attempts have had in the area of
workmen's compensation, are the subject of this article.
I. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED
In decisions subsequent to Jensen the Supreme Court began to
set apart some areas of maritime employment as being of merely
local concern where the application of state workmen's compensa-
tion laws would not work material prejudice to the characteristic
features of a general maritime law.7 There grew up a sizable body
of law defining the boundary between national and local activ-
ities.8 In 1927, after two attempts to permit the application of
state compensation laws to maritime employment - both declared
unconstitutional 9 Congress passed the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, extending compensatory
relief to workers injured in maritime employment on the navigable
waters of the United States wherever "recovery for the disability
or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
6 244 U.S. at 216.,
7 E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
8 For a defense of this body of jurisprudence, see Dickinson & Andrews, A
Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the United States, 36 CALIF. L. REv.
169, 179 (5948). For a competent judicial application of it in its heyday, see Motor
Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
For citations of cases that go to make it up, see Davis v. Department of Labor, 317
U.S. 249, 253 n.2 (1942).
9 40 STAT. 395 (1917) added to the section of the Judicial Code giving the
district courts jurisdiction of admiralty causes, "saving to suitors, in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it,"
36 STAT. io91 (1911), the words "and to claimants the rights and remedies
under the workmen's compensation law of any state." This was stricken down in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). A further congressional
attempt to amend this clause so as to leave state remedies intact was stricken down
in Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
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validly be provided by State law." 'o By so limiting federal relief,
Congress seemed to have adopted the distinctions between national
and local matters that had been developed since the Jensen deci-
sion. Consequently these distinctions were carried over into cases
considering whether the injured worker should seek compensation
under the state law or under the Longshoremen's Act. The result
was that in each case an examination of the facts was required to
determine whether the case fell into one category or the other, and
the worker was granted or denied compensation depending on
which remedy he chose to pursue.1
The first attempt to get the Supreme Court to reconsider the
entire area of workmen's compensation for maritime employees
in the light of contemporary constitutional doctrines came in
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc.'2 The Fourth Circuit had re-
versed an award of compensation under the Longshoremen's Act,
holding, for reasons not satisfactory to the Supreme Court, that
the demonstration of a motor boat to a prospective purchaser was
a matter of only local concern. Counsel for the employer there-
fore offered the Court a more basic contention, arguing that the
language of the Longshoremen's Act barred its application in any
case for which state law could validly provide, that the only
reason state law could not be applied in the instant case was Jensen,
and that Jensen was bad law and should be overruled. Then state
law could be validly applied, and the Longshoremen's Act would
be excluded by its own terms. The Court, however, unanimously
rejected this opportunity to abandon Jensen. Whatever its status
as constitutional law, the Court held, Jensen was conclusive of the
meaning of the word "validly" as used by Congress in making the
applicability of the Longshoremen's Act turn on whether state law
could validly provide relief.
Such, then, was the state of the law when one Davis met his
death by drowning in the Snohomish River. At the time of the
accident he had been standing on a barge checking steel as it was
put on board in the process of dismantling a bridge. His widow
1044 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 9o3(a) (1952). A provision of the same
section limiting recovery to injuries sustained on navigable waters seems to be
responsive to State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922),
which held that a state could afford compensation to longshoremen injured on land.
" Allen, The "Twilight Zone" Between the Jurisdictions of State and Federal
Compensation Acts, 16 INS. COUNSEL J. 202, 203 (2949).
12 314 U.S. 244 (X94z).
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sought relief under the Washington state compensation act, 8 but
was turned down by the state board on the ground that Davis'
employment - loading a vessel - was exclusively subject to fed-
eral jurisdiction. The state courts sustained the administrative
decision against the contention that dismantling a bridge was a
matter of merely local concern. 4 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court declared that the line between activities properly
covered by the state act and those reserved to federal administra-
tion under the Longshoremen's Act was so "undefined and
undefinable" that presumptive weight ought to attach to an as-
sumption of jurisdiction by either state or federal authorities. 5
The opinion sets forth persuasive policy reasons for the result
the Court reached. Both Congress and the state legislature intend-
ed to provide the worker and his family with a speedy and certain
remedy for industrial injuries. But under the existing law an em-
ployee might have to go through several appellate courts before
finding whether the remedy he chose in good faith was the right
one. And if, after all this litigation, the employee lost, he might
find that the remedy he should have pursued was barred by the
statute of limitations. At the same time, an employer might find
that the insurance he had bought under the law he supposed to be
applicable to his employees did not cover him, since his employees
were compelled to make their claims under the other law.
On what conceptual basis could these difficulties be avoided?
The Court retained the Jensen criterion of interference with the
harmony and uniformity of the maritime law as determinative of
whether state or federal law applied, but characterized the deter-
mination as factual. On this premise an award of federal com-
pensation could be sustained on the familiar doctrine of adminis-
trative finality without precluding the subsequent application of
state law to similar situations. In the instant case, however, where
the applicability of state law was in question, the Court drew its
presumptions from a different source. The state law, the Court
noted, purported to cover this situation, and there had been no
"conflicting process of administration" "I under the federal act.
1 3 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7673 (1932).
14 Davis v. Department of Labor, i2 Wash. 2d 349, 12X P.2d 365 (1942).
"
5
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255 (2942). "There is . . .
clearly a twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights determined
case by case . . . ." Id. at 256.
- Id. at 258.
[Vol. 68
'955] COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME WORKERS 641
Accordingly, the state law had to be applied unless it was uncon-
stitutional. But the law should not be held unconstitutional in an
equivocal fact situation. Thus the applicability of the state law
was to be upheld.
The difficulty with this approach is that by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court the "factual" question had already
been resolved, by the state administrative agency, against state
compensation. Thus application of the doctrine of administrative
finality would seem to have required affirmance of that adminis-
trative decision. There must therefore have been another step in
the reasoning leading to the decision.
Arguably, what the Supreme Court was doing in reversing
Davis was advising the state courts and agency that the question
before them was to be treated as one of fact, even though it had
previously been regarded as one of law. The Texas Supreme
Court in Emmons v. Pacific Indemnity Co.17 seems to have read
Davis in this way. Emmons, injured while doing metal work on a
barge, was denied compensation by the state board on grounds of
exclusive federal jurisdiction, and in the trial de novo provided
by local practice the judge took the case from the jury on the
same ground. The state supreme court, relying heavily on the
Court's statement that the question of interference with the har-
mony and uniformity of the maritime law was factual, outlined at
some length the pre-Davis criteria for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, and held that it could not be said as a matter of law that those
criteria were met in the Emmons case. Apparently, then, the jury
should have determined whether they obtained.'
Reading Davis as requiring state agencies to treat certain ques-
tions as questions of fact, not of law, raises two troublesome
considerations. First, a state court may be reluctant to have its
control over its own administrative bodies governed by the Su-
preme Court's characterization of the questions before them.
Second, while the basic question has been called factual by the
Supreme Court, its contours have been filled out by a long series
17 146 Tex. 496, 208 S.W.2d 884 (1948).
"' For a somewhat different, but equally conservative, approach to Davis during
this period, see HoRoviTz, WoRmNI's COMPENsATION 31 (1944).
In Green v. Simpson & Brown Constr. Co., 24 N.J. Super. 422, 94 A.2d 693
(County Ct. 1953), the court held that evidence of death in connection with work
on a barge being used in bridge building made out a prima fade showing that the
case was within state jurisdiction as "maritime but local," so that dismissal by the
agency at the close of plaintiff's evidence was improper.
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of judicial decisions, all of which purported to be dealing with
questions of law, and none of which was overruled in Davis.
These difficulties came up in two almost simultaneous cases from
opposite coasts of the country, which were to put an entirely dif-
ferent complexion on Davis.
In the latter half of 1945, two shipyard workers, Moores in
East Boston, and Baskin in San Francisco, were injured under
circumstances indistinguishable from those held to be of ex-
clusively federal cognizance in the important pre-Davis case of
John Baizley Iron Works v. Span."9 State compensation was
awarded to Moores in Massachusetts, but denied to Baskin in
California. The California appellate court took the more con-
servative view; Davis, it held, had no application where the
earlier precedents were unequivocal; consequently Baskin's case
was not within the "twilight zone." 20 This approach represents
the customary mode of appellate review of factual determinations:
where a question of fact has an obvious answer, the trier of fact
will be allowed to find no other. And whether or not the answer is
"obvious" is a question of law to be decided on the basis of
precedents.
The Massachusetts court went on an entirely different tack."
The court pointed out that it must draw its own conclusions from
the subsidiary facts found by the compensation commission,22 thus
impliedly rejecting as a guide to its review of administrative deter-
minations the Supreme Court's characterization of the Jensen
criterion as factual. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the award
of compensation. It noted that, unless federal law was controlling,
the state statute would apply to the facts of the case, and that
while, on the basis of earlier decisions, the case was within the
area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the policy considerations
underlying Davis seemed to be equally applicable here, and it
could be predicted with some certainty that the Supreme Court
would affirm an award of compensation. Hence the court found
no federal obstacle to the application of the state statute, reading
Davis as setting up a zone of "overlap" 23 in which state and fed-
19 281 U.S. 222 (I93o).
2' Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549
(1949).
21 Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948).
22 Id. at 164, So N.E.2d at 479.
2 1 Id. at i66, So N.E.2d at 480.
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eral authority were concurrently exercisable in order to avoid the
hardship of compelling the injured workman to proceed anew
after a false start. The court seemed to recognize that the Long-
shoremen's Act was so worded as to require mutual exclusiveness,
but found no clear way out of the dilemma:
Probably therefore our proper course is not to attempt to reason the
matter through and to reconcile previous authorities, or to preserve fine
lines of distinction, but rather simply to recognize the futility of at-
tempting to reason logically about "illogic," and to treat the Davis case
as intended to be a revolutionary decision deemed necessary to escape
an intolerable situation .... 24
When the two cases reached the Supreme Court, the Massachu-
setts decision was affirmed per curiam, with a citation to Davis,
25
and the California decision was vacated and remanded for recon-
sideration in light of the affirmance of Moores.2  On remand,
the California court sent the case back to the commission with
directions to take jurisdiction. 7
The Supreme Court, by affirming Moores, did not necessarily
adopt the reasoning of the Massachusetts court; it may have ap-
plied the same presumptions it set up in Davis. But, while it is
possible that the Court still purports to adhere to the statutory
standard of mutual exclusiveness, the state courts would seem to
be abandoning it. As long as the Supreme Court goes on affirming
state court decisions, there is no obstacle to their doing so. Thus,
while it seems clear that in many situations the courts will affirm
ah award of compensation under either state or federal law, it is
not at all clear whether the two are in theory still mutually ex-
clusive. The resulting uncertainty bears on a number of problems
in the enforcement of compensation acts, as will be discussed in
the following section."8
24 Id. at i67, 8o N.E.2d at 481. The court was referring to Justice Frankfurter's
statement in Davis: "Theoretic illogic is inevitable so long as the employee in a
situation like the present is permitted to recover either under the federal act ...
or under a state statute." 317 U.S. at 259 (concurring opinion).
25 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
28 Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (I949).
11 Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 257, 217 P.2d 733
(950).
2S 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 89.20--25 (1952) divides the fore-
going history into five phases: "I: unqualified federal pre-eminence" from Jensen
to Grant-Smith Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), "II: the 'maritime-
but-local' test" from Rohde to the enactment of the Longshoremen's Act, "III:
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.II. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT Dm NOT DEcmE
A. Administrative Finality in the Twilight Zone
It would seem that the person left most in the dark by the refer-
ences to administrative finality in Davis is the administrator: he
is not told whether he is free to turn down a twilight zone case in
favor of the other jurisdiction, or, if he is, what standards he
should employ in making his decision. Unless the principle of
mutual exclusiveness has been abandoned even on the theoretical
level, he must preface any award of compensation with some sort
of determination that the law he is administering obtains to the
exclusion of the other.
There is no record of an appeal from a decision of a federal
deputy commissioner's decision turning down a twilight zone case
in favor of state jurisdiction; perhaps on such an appeal the courts
would follow the social policy articulated in Davis by abandoning
the administrative finality rationale. But, assuming that the com-
missioner would be sustained in his denial of jurisdiction, what
should be his guiding considerations? The Longshoremen's Act
provides that the claim is presumed to come within its provisions
unless there is "substantial evidence to the contrary." 29 But the
Supreme Court said in Davis that the state act should be presumed
to apply in the absence of a "conflicting process of administra-
tion." 30 Substantial evidence that there had been no such process
would seem, then, to be sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the federal act applied. By this reasoning, the deputy commission-
the Longshoremen's Act" until Davis, "IV: the 'twilight zone' rule" from Davis to
Moores, and "V: concurrent jurisdiction?" The anticipated difficulty of defining
the boundaries of the twilight zone or zone of overlap, see Dickinson & Andrews,
supra note 8, seems not to have materialized. Indeed, in view of Avondale Marine
Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (i953), it appears that any case doubt-
ful enough to be litigated is doubtful enough to be included within the twilight
zone. If there is any limit on this process, it may be found in Justice Black's
statement in his opinion in Davis that the twilight zone "includes persons such as
the decedent who are, as a matter of actual administration, in fact protected under
the state compensation act." 317 U.S. at 256. Those persons left out under
this criterion, however, will probably be engaged in employments such as steve-
doring in which the federal remedy is well recognized. Thus, they will be unlikely
to seek the state remedy through inadvertence, and it is very rarely to their
financial advantage to do so, since in most cases the Longshoremen's Act will pay
more generous benefits than the state act.
2044 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (X952).3 See pp. 64o-4i supra.
[Vol. 68
1955] COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME WORKERS 645
er would never be justified in bringing the "conflicting process"
into being.
Since it is not clear what the Court meant by the absence of
"conflicting process," the deputy commissioner might reasonably
conclude that it was only referring to the fact that in Davis the
state tribunal had been the first approached. If so, the filing of a
claim before him wQuld by itself constitute a conflicting process
and eliminate the presumption in favor of the state law. The com-
missioner might reach the same result by interpreting Davis to
mean that the presumption in favor of the state law obtained only
before a tribunal of the state.
3 1
Would the presumption that the federal act applied be overcome
by evidence that the operation of state law in the case would not
interfere with the harmony and uniformity of maritime law? Since
Davis characterizes this question as factual, it ought to follow that
the federal deputy commissioner must hear evidence on it and
make a finding. But all the decisions on the question antedate
Davis. They deal with the issue as one of law, and the Supreme
Court evidently has abandoned that approach. Thus, having no
standards for making his decision, the commissioner could hardly
be blamed if he went through the motions of making a finding
without any serious consideration of the evidence, or, as is more
likely, ignored the whole problem and proceeded to the award.
Even if Davis'is read to mean that state and federal law are no
longer mutually exclusive in this area, the same "factual" question
may arise in considering the applicability of the Longshoremen's
Act on its own terms, which limit it to situations for which state
law cannot "validly" provide. If the zone of "overlap" was cre-
ated simply by mitigating the effect of Jensen as a restriction on
state activity here, there would remain intact the holding in Motor
Boat that Jensen defines the scope of the Longshoremen's Act. In
other words, even though the state is now free to act in ways that
were hitherto supposed to interfere improperly with the general
s, The Davis opinion bears this out somewhat by quoting the following language
from Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935),
a case involving the application of the extraterritorial provisions of the California
workmen's compensation law to an injury in Alaska: "Prima facie every state is
entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted." 317 U.S. at
258. Thus it has been suggested that the Court has returned to the principle that
state courts are not bound by the substantive principles of admiralty law. Note,
2 STAx. L. REv. 536 (ig5o). Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 4o6 (1953),
would seem, however, to have laid this view to rest.
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maritime law, the federal act is still limited by its own terms to
situations in which the Court had previously found that state ac-
tivity would work such interference. Here again the federal dep-
uty commissioner will have to deal with the problem of whether a
finding of fact is necessary.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the Supreme Court
has abandoned any attempt to give effect to the statutory limita-
tion in the Longshoremen's Act. Such a departure could be justi-
fied on the ground that the statutory language was intended to
insure benefits to certain workers, was responsive to a climate of
judicial decision that no longer existed, and may be abandoned to
the extent necessary to give effect to the underlying policy of the
act.32 If this was the effect of Davis, of course no finding as to the
applicability of the federal statutory provision would be necessary
to an assumption of federal jurisdiction.
The state tribunals, in administering their workmen's com-
pensation laws, are faced with rather different questions. While
the question of interference with the harmony and uniformity of
the maritime law may still be formally relevant, the state courts,
in reviewing determinations of the question by their own adminis-
trative agencies, are not bound to regard it as a question of fact.
This was at least implied by the Massachusetts court in Moores's
Case. 3 But if the question is one of law, it is for the state court
to determine on the basis of the applicable decisions of the Su-
preme Court. In other words, it would seem to be incumbent on
state tribunals to follow the mandate of their own legislatures,
unless some principle of federal law would lead the Supreme Court
to reverse. In the few cases that have been decided, the state
courts appear to have compelled their agencies to take jurisdiction
wherever prior decisions indicated that the Supreme Court would
allow them to do so.
3 4
In some states, however, the compensation law is expressly
inapplicable to maritime employment for which a rule of liability
is provided by federal law.35 In such states the courts might ex-
32 See Note, Judicial Abrogation of the Obsolete Statute: A Comparative Study,
64 HAxv. L. REv. 1I8I (I95I).
33 See pp. 642-43 supra.
14 Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 257, 217 P.2d 733
(195o); Hammond v. Albany Garage Co., 267 App. Div. 647, 47 N.Y.S.2d 897
(3d Dep't 1944).
3 ' E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-03 (1942); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.110-I (I949).
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dude their compensation laws from the entire twilight zone on the
ground that a federal remedy was available. The alternatives
would be to adopt some set of presumptions like those set up in
Davis, or some standard of interpretation like that in Motor Boat,
or both, or to hold that the legislature in enacting such a provision
meant only to embody the federal constitutional limitation, for-
bidding no more than would be forbidden from time to time by the
Supreme Court.
B. Exclusive Remedies Provisions in the Twilight Zone
Part of the scheme of every compensation act, including the
Longshoremen's Act, is a provision counterbalancing the burden
of liability without fault by immunizing a complying employer
against common-law liability to his employees for compensable
injuries.36 The federal act and most state acts further provide
that where the employer has failed to comply with the security
provisions of the act by purchasing approved insurance, or by
obtaining a self-insurer's permit, an injured employee may bring
a court action against him under rules of liability considerably
broader than the common law.37 Provisions of this sort are the
most effective device for enforcing the security requirements of
the acts; it would seem that a jurisdiction should be able to apply
such a provision in any case in which it could grant compensation,
even though another jurisdiction likewise competent to afford
compensation had attempted to insulate the employer against
common-law liability.38 Thus, if the state and federal jurisdictions
There was such a provision in the Washington act involved in Davis. WASH. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7693a (1932).
"6E.g., 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW § ii; WAsH3. REV. STAT. AN. 88 7673, 7679 (1932). It appears that
provisions of this sort are meant to abolish only the common-law right of action,
and will not be read as precluding an award of compensation under the laws of
another jurisdiction. See Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
37 E.g., 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW § II. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7676 (1932) formerly provided a
similar right of action in case of default in compulsory contributions to the state
insurance fund, but this was repealed, Wash. Laws 1947, c. 247, § 4d.
3s There seems to be no case on this, but if the policy of one jurisdiction is not
opposed to an award of compensation by the other, it should not be opposed to the
maintenance of an action whose purpose is to compel the purchase of compensation
insurance. In other contexts, the forum has been held competent to enforce its
own compensation laws despite the attempt of another jurisdiction to make the
remedy provided by its own law exclusive. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 3o6 U.S. 493 (1939). Of course, if there were a true
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coverlap," an employer presumably has to insure under both acts
in order to escape common-law liability.
But what are the employer's liabilities and the employee's reme-
dies as long as the theoretically mutual exclusiveness of state and
federal relief is preserved in this area? In the more likely case,
where it is federal insurance that the employer has failed to pro-
vide, 9 the court deciding whether a twilight zone employee can
maintain a common-law action is faced with the same problem as
is the federal deputy commissioner resolving the "factual" ques-
tion established in Davis. But here the burden of proof on the
question whether federal or state law applies is on the plaintiff,
rather than on the defendant; the resolution of that question is
therefore all the more imperative for the employee. Yet if Davis
gave the commissioner unreviewable discretion to decide the ques-
tion because of his expertise or his policy-making function, the
court would seem to be incompetent to resolve it. And even if it
could be resolved by the court, it would have to be submitted under
appropriate instructions to the jury. The spectacle of twelve citi-
zens deciding whether state activity will interfere with the har-
mony and uniformity of maritime law is not likely to commend
itself to the judiciary. If it is state insurance the employer has
failed to provide, the problem is simpler. The state court could
policy conflict, the state could not, even in its own courts, allow its own law to
prevail over the federal law, as it could over that of another state. See Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1g47). In any event, the state law would afford no protection
to an employer who failed to buy federal insurance.
11 Since the worker must always be afloat when injured if he is to recover federal
compensation, it is hard to imagine an employer with no possible liability under a
state compensation law. Thus, if he insures at all, he will insure under the state law.
Insurance companies afford federal insurance automatically in classifications with
significant maritime exposure, with a single rate for the combined federal and
state coverages. Thus, the chief possibilities of failure to insure are in the case of
an employer whose work is not of a type usually performed afloat. Other possi-
bilities are assigned risks under some state plan, who are often not given federal
insurance, or employers in states where compensation insurance is a monopoly of a
state fund which is not authorized by state law to afford insurance under the
Longshoremen's Act. Other problems similar to the questions presented by the
uninsured employer are those involving the scope in the twilight zone of a provision
like MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 152, § 25 (1932), requiring a compensation carrier to pay
the full amount of any judgment against its insured for damages on account of a
compensable injury, and those involving the different state and federal interpreta-
tions of the effect of a provision barring common-law liability on contribution
among joint tortfeasors or on "liability over." See 64 HARv. L. REV. 492 (z95z) ;
Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953),
and cases cited therein, id. at 566-67, 75 S.E.2d at 773-74.
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probably take the position that, since the Supreme Court would
affirm an award of compensation, the state act would apply in
toto.
40
C. Res Judicata in the Twilight Zone
The question whether an award by one jurisdiction bars a sub-
sequent award by the other may depend on how Davis is inter-
preted. The problem can be sketched out quickly. If the jurisdic-
tions are mutually exclusive, and it is a question of fact which act
applies, litigation of the factual issue in one jurisdiction should
bar a relitigation in the other, on the familiar principles of res
judicata.4 1 This has been the rule on cases involving the question
whether an injured person was subject to a state compensation
law or the Federal Employers' Liability Act.42 Cases both before
and after Davis suggest situations where the rule should be applied
to the Longshoremen's Act.4" If the jurisdictions are held to be
concurrent, a state award ought not to bar relief under the Long-
shoremen's Act, although the amount recoverable will be reduced
to the extent that prior relief has been obtained. 44 Nor should a
federal award preclude recovery under the state act, although if
controlling weight is given to the reference in Davis to a "conflict-
ing process of administration," a federal award would seem to
constitute such a process and bar subsequent state awards.
Two cases decided since Davis deserve mention. In Dunleavy
v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks 4 5 a New Jersey court held that
40 See note 34 supra.
41 See 2 LAtsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 89.51-.52 (i952).
4235 STAT. 65 (i9o8), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v.
Schendel, 270 U.S. 6i (1926); Landreth v. Wabash R.R., x53 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 855 (1946). In each of these cases the state compensation
proceeding was initiated by the employer and contested by the claimant.4
1 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lawson, is F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Ga.
1936); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.
1945).44 It may be argued that a state award merges with and bars the federal. Cf.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (i943). But see Industrial Comm'n
v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (i947); 66 HARv. L. REV. 524 (I953). Cases hold
that acceptance of state compensation constitutes an accord and satisfaction of a
federal cause of action. E.g., Owens v. Hammond Lumber Co., 8 F. Supp. 392
(N.D. Cal. 1934). Contra, Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armoa, i65 F.2d 301 (ist
Cir. 1948). All these cases arose in Jones Act litigation, and would not be applicable
here, in view of 44 STAT. 1427, 1434 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 9o8(i),
915(b) (1952), invalidating settlements made without the approval of the deputy
commissioner.
45 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343 (County Ct. i951), aff'd on opinion below, 20
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state and federal relief were mutually exclusive, but that juris-
diction "vested" in the body first approached. This view seems
without adequate support in the decisions or comments,46 though
if it operated only in favor of the federal jurisdiction there would
be some ground for it in the doctrine of supremacy of federal law.
The other case is Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. O'Hearne,47 in which the Fourth Circuit passed on an award
made under the federal act after an award under the state act;
the court held that the case fell within the purview of the federal
statute and outside the permissible scope of state laws. The court
said that since awards had been made under both laws it would
make its decision without regard to any presumption - as if Davis
had not been decided. This is odd doctrine, but seems to have been
followed.
4
D. The Twilight Zone in Areas Not Subject to the
Longshoremen's Act
Certain areas of maritime employment are not covered by the
Longshoremen's Act. In these areas, unless state compensation is
available, the injured workman must proceed under the general
maritime law, or its statutory modification, the Jones Act.4" If
state compensation is to be excluded, it must be on account of some
constitutional restriction on modifying the general maritime law -
the Jensen doctrine -or because the Jones Act has pre-empted
N.J. Super. 486, go A.2d 84 (App. Div.), cert. denied, io N.J. 343, 91 A.2d 448
(1952).
46 Though it is perhaps implicit in 66 HARv. L. Rv. 524 (1953).
47 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. '95').
4 See Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (gth Cir. 1952).
49"41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). The act incorporates by
reference federal laws dealing with injuries to railroad employees -a system that
eliminates many defenses available to the employer at common law, but retains fault
as a basis of liability. The Jones Act applies to "seamen," a term which has been held
to include longshoremen. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50
(1926). Under the general maritime law, a seaman has a remedy against a shipowner
for "unseaworthiness"; this was held available to longshoremen in Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). The general maritime law also affords a crew
member maintenance and cure for injuries sustained while in the service of the ship.
This right includes such medical services as may help ameliorate the condition of
the injured man, and living expenses while treatment is being undergone. For a
general discussion of these remedies, see Howe, Rights of Maritime Workers, 5
NACCA L.J. 146; 6 id. at 131 (90go). Their chief omission is that they make no
provision for the family of a worker killed without fault on anyone's part. The
Longshoremen's Act, of course, supersedes all these remedies as between a subject
employee and his employer.
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the field. Although the concept of a general maritime law may still
have considerable vitality in other contexts, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that Jensen will not be extended to invalidate
state regulation of aspects of the employment relationship other
than workmen's compensation.50 Within the compensation field
Jensen probably retains no force except as enshrined in the Long-
shoremen's Act by the Motor Boat case. The Jones Act, on the
other hand, incorporating by reference the federal laws dealing
with injuries to railroad employees, would seem, like them, to ex-
clude state activity,5' although one circuit has held the contrary. 2
The most important exclusion from the Longshoremen's Act is
that of masters and members of the crews of vessels. 53 It appears
that these workers were excluded by Congress at the behest of
their representatives, who considered their remedies under the
general maritime law, as supplemented by the Jones Act, superior
to any practicable compensation benefits. 4 These remedies are
available, it is now settled, even if the master or crew member is
injured on land.55 They appear to be exclusive of state compen-
sation on land as well as of federal compensation on the water.Y6
50 In Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 3o6 (1943), it was held that
a state could levy an unemployment insurance tax on maritime employments. "In-
deed," said the Court, "the Jensen case has already been severely limited, and has
no vitality beyond that which may continue as to state workmen's compensation
laws. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales . . . ." Id. at 3o9.
5' The doctrine of New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (I917), that
a state cannot afford compensation to railroad employees subject to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, was recently reaffirmed by implication in South Buffalo
Ry. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367 (1953). Presumably, therefore, it rests on a firmer
foundation than Jensen. Thus, while recent cases denying applicability of state laws
to Jones Act situations have relied heavily on Jensen, Alaska Industrial Board v.
Alaska Packers Ass'n, 186 F.2d 1O15 (9th Cir. 1951); Occidental Indemnity Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 310, 149 P.2d 841 (1944), their result would
probably survive an overruling of that decision.
5 2 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Toups, 172 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1949). This was a com-
pensation proceeding brought by the family of a crew member who had drowned
without anyone's fault; here neither the Jones Act nor the general maritime law
afforded a remedy. The court rejected the pre-emption argument on the basis of
some sort of pre-Davis local concern learning. This would seem to be an instance
of a hard case making bad law.
5344 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1952).
5' See Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 570 (1944).
11 O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) (Jones
Act); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943) (maintenance and cure).
11 Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 31o,
149 P.2d 841 (1944); Rudolph v. Industrial Marine Serv., 187 Tenn. 119, 213
S.W.2d 30 (1948); Note, 29 B.U.L. RWv. 116 (1949).
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The question whether a given person is a master or member of
the crew is of course the same whether the compensation alter-
native is state or federal.5 7 Despite the difficulty of the question 58
the courts have refused to set up a twilight zone in which alter-
native remedies are available to a person whose status as
a master or crew member is equivocal. 9 The advocates of such a
twilight zone may find some support in a Fifth Circuit holding that
state compensation may be paid to a crew member where this
would not prejudice the proper harmony and uniformity of the
maritime law; 'o the First Circuit seems to have rejected any such
doctrine." There is little authority for importing a presumption
of administrative finality, on which the establishment of a twilight
zone theory on the order of Davis depends, into the question
whether a person is a master or member of the crew. 2 The Su-
preme Court expressly rejected the contention that an adminis-
trative finding under the Longshoremen's Act must be accorded
finality against a claim of crew membership.63 It would seem that
any presumption of validity attached to a state statute or adminis-
trative decision would fare no better.
Another important exception in the Longshoremen's Act is that,
being limited to injuries sustained on the navigable waters of the
57 It appears to be, at least in part, by virtue of a congressional intent implicit
in the Longshoremen's Act that the remedies of crew members are unavailable to
other maritime employees injured on land. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. I
(1946). Thus, the scope of these remedies on land must be coextensive with the
exception in the Longshoremen's Act, as it is on sea.
"8 See Note, 8 NACCA L.J. 149, 153-55 (i95i).
59 Ibid. The arguments against setting up such a twilight zone are rather
similar to those stated on pp. 65o-5i. See 2 LuAsox, WoR MEiN's COMPENSATION
§ 90.4i (1952). The author also seems persuaded by the analogy to the exclusiveness
of the acts dealing with railroad employees. 2 id. § 9042.
60 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Toups, 172 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1949). See note 52 supra.
61 Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armao, 165 F.2d 301 (ist Cir. 1948). Some of the
cases cited in note 56 supra seem to bear obliquely on the same point. ,
62 In the Toups case, supra note 6o, the court treated as a question of law what
the Supreme Court in Davis called a question of fact. Gahagan Constr. Corp. v.
Armao, supra note 61, paid a modicum of attention to a jury finding of crew
membership, but no more. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S.
251 (1940) relied in part on an administrative finding under the Longshoremen's
Act that claimant was not a master or crew member, but Norton v. Warner Co.,
321 U.S. 565 (1944) seems to have limited this doctrine severely. In Daffin v.
Pape, "7O F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1948), the majority held that Norton left no room
for finality except where the incidents of the employment were themselves in dispute.
13Norton v. Warner Co., supra note 62. The maritime unions appeared as
amici curiae in this case, and stressed the importance to them of the exception in
the Longshoremen's Act.
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United States, it does not apply to accidents on the high seas or
in foreign ports.6 4 The remedy of a longshoreman injured on
board ship in the Canal Zone has been held to be under the Jones
Act.65 If such a longshoreman were a resident of California hired
in California for work in Panama, the California act would pur-
port to cover him,66 but would be barred by the Jones Act just as
if the employee were a seaman injured in California.
Let us see how this works. Suppose a California contractor
sends a crew of men to dismantle a bridge over the Panama Canal.
A man is injured checking steel being loaded aboard a barge. Un-
less federal law provides otherwise, California affords compensa-
tion and excludes all other remedies. The employee's argument in
proceedings under the Jones Act is that, since both the Long-
shoremen's Act and the Jones Act cover maritime employment,
any employment subject to the Longshoremen's Act when it is
conducted on the navigable waters of the United States is subject
to the Jones Act when conducted on foreign navigable waters. The
employer may contend, first, that the Jones Act does not cover all
maritime employment, but only that traditionally undertaken by
the ship's crew,67 and second, that in the instant proceeding the
employment would not have been within the scope of the Long-
shoremen's Act if conducted on the navigable waters of the United
States. It is true that, thanks to Davis, an administrative award
of federal compensation for injuries sustained under similar cir-
cumstances at home would be upheld. But absent both the ad-
ministrative finding and the statutory presumption of jurisdiction
under the Longshoremen's Act, the result should not be the same.
At least, the employer will contend, he should be allowed to intro-
6444 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1952).
65 Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, iII F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1940).
68 CAL. LABOR CODE § 5305 (1953). Most other compensation laws, by statute
or decision, operate in the same way. See RESTATEmrENT, CoMICr oF LAWS § 398
(1934).
1 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926) held that
shipside longshoremen were "seamen" within the meaning of the Jones Act because
their work was traditionally done by the ship's crew. The case has not undergone
further development because the enactment of the Longshoremen's Act has made
it academic in most contexts, and has made less urgent the policy considerations
behind it. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. i (1946) held that the purpose of
limiting the Longshoremen's Act to injuries on the navigable waters was to allow
state compensation to operate elsewhere. Claimant had combined Haverty with
O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (I943) (Jones Act applies
to crew members injured on land), to contend that the remedy of a longshoreman
injured on land was under the Jones Act.
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duce evidence that an award of state compensation would not
interfere with the harmony or uniformity of the maritime law.
If, instead of a Jones Act suit, a state compensation proceeding
is brought, it may be argued in favor of state jurisdiction that this
is a twilight zone case. But there are cogent reasons for not
applying the twilight zone doctrine where the alternative to a state
award is the Jones Act instead of the Longshoremen's Act. It is
one thing to make a choice between two summary remedies and
quite another to make a choice between a summary remedy and a
full court trial. Moreover, it is arguable that the liability without
fault basis of workmen's compensation is economically feasible
only because it insulates the employer against high jury awards in
negligence cases, and that it would be too severe a strain to expose
the employer to the alternatives of state compensation and the
Jones Act. Furthermore, the reasons for the Supreme Court's
refusal to uphold an award under the Longshoremen's Act on the
basis of administrative finality where the alternative is a suit for
damages under the Jones Act apply with equal force here.6 Prob-
ably, therefore, state jurisdiction would not be upheld on a twi-
light zone theory.
But the employee need not rest his claim on the twilight zone
doctrine. He can contend that the Jones Act is inapplicable to his
case, presenting the same arguments his employer would make
defending against proceedings brought under the Jones Act. With
the Jones Act out of the way, there would remain no further
obstacle to a state compensation award except the Jensen doctrine.
And it seems unlikely that the Court would invoke that doctrine
today, absent the complicating federal legislative structure pre-
sented by the Longshoremen's Act.69
III. CONCLUSION
By the time the Motor Boat case arose, it was fairly clear that
Jensen and the cases following it were, as to some workers, frus-
trating the legislative policy of affording a summary remedy for
8 See notes 62 and 63 supra.
11 "Since 1917, Congress and the states have sought to restore order out of the
confusion which resulted from the Jensen decision." Davis v. Department of Labor,
317 U.S. 249, 255 (942). This certainly indicates a dislike of Jensen. Furthermore,
Jensen is being more and more confined to cases in which the complicating legisla-
tive structure exists. See Sorenson v. City of New York, 202 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.
1953), and cases cited therein.
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industrial injuries under the various compensation laws. To be
sure, the distinctions made in the cases could be applied with some
facility - if not with complete unanimity - by the courts. But
such distinctions are litigious; even if we accept the optimistic
view that the multiplication of case law will eventually clarify all
of them, the process is at best a long one. 70 It may well be said
that such distinctions have no place in an area in which there is
a strong policy in favor of affording a summary remedy. One
might have expected the Supreme Court to attempt to formulate
a new line of distinction more easy to apply. That it did not do
so is perhaps the result of a belief that no distinction drawn on a
case-by-case basis can avoid being litigious, and that the use of
a single case to state arbitrarily a mechanical criterion of general
applicability would be beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial
power.
It is more difficult to see why the Court did not take the op-
portunity presented in the Motor Boat case to make Congress
redraw the line. The elimination of the general maritime law as
an inhibition on state regulation of the employment relationship
would have resulted in the complete debilitation of the Long-
shoremen's Act, since state law could "validly" be applied in the
whole field. Had the Court adopted this view, steps could have
been taken to have the act amended to state a nonlitigious crite-
rion. But since at that time some maritime states afforded higher
benefits than the Longshoremen's Act, others lower, the result
might instead have been a political controversy of a sort that the
Court would be reluctant to touch off. It seems probable that the
Motor Boat decision was motivated by some such consideration,
for the canon of statutory construction ostensibly relied on by the
Court has little to recommend it, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed
out a year later when a majority of the Court used it to frustrate
a desirable tax reform. 7'
The Davis solution, then, has some practical justifications. The
relevant considerations are stated in the opinion: the existing
law was objectionable because of the uncertainty of the remedy;
but too radical a departure would also have caused trouble by
'o See HoLMas, THE CoMMoN LAW 127 (188I). Justice Black, from his pref-
atory remarks in Davis, would seem to doubt if even long-run certainty could be
achieved. 317 U.S. at 253.
" Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 404 (1943). Note that Justice Black,
the author of the Motor Boat opinion, joined in the dissent.
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upsetting the large area in which there were satisfactory statutory
and administrative adjustments of long duration. The objections
to the opinion are on a conceptual level; after stating the relevant
social considerations, the Court goes on to construct a conceptual
underpinning which not only is specious, but also creates great
practical difficulties if an attempt is made to apply it in other con-
texts. Should the Court have found it necessary to erect such a
structure? Granted the obvious desirability of affording a sum-
mary remedy to the injured worker and his family, there are still
judicial considerations that also have a legitimate claim to be
called social values and should not be abandoned altogether.
The creation of a zone of "overlap" ought to have been reconciled
with the express terms of the federal and state statutes, which
provide for mutual exclusiveness, and with the doctrine of pre-
emption by federal legislative action. There may be important
reasons for not respecting either of them in this case, but we would
like to have had those reasons articulated by the Court so that we
could develop a body of authority on the limits of these principles,
rather than be left with an uneasy feeling that they are being
eroded by forces we do not understand.
The uniformity of the general maritime law has much to recom-
mend it- in a number of situations. The states are inappropriate
governmental units for dealing with many of the problems that
arise in maritime commerce. The exclusion of the states from
substantive legislation in the whole field depends on Jensen. Yet
the Court's sweeping criticism of Jensen has left in some doubt
such questions as whether a maritime contract is still immune to
objections based on the local statute of frauds.72 Several com-
mentators have suggested that Jensen has been abandoned sub
silentio both as a principle of constitutional law and as adopted
by the Longshoremen's Act.78 All the Court need have done was to
abandon the view that the harmony and uniformity of the mari-
time law were prejudiced by state interference with the employ-
ment relations of local longshoremen and harbor workers; the
maritime law generally could have been left with such stability as
it derived from Jensen.
The characterization by the Court of the question of state
interference with the general maritime law as one of fact suggests
7 See Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (I919).
7s E.g., Howe, Rights of Maritime Workers, 5 NACCA L.J. 146, 152 (1950);
Allen, supra note ii, at 207-08.
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that other complex questions of constitutional policy might also
be so characterized. Davis could be used to support the proposi-
tion that the question whether a state tax would impose an undue
burden on interstate commerce, or whether an industry over which
a state labor board claimed jurisdiction is one affecting inter-
state commerce, is factual, and that state action should be
presumed constitutional.74 While those propositions are tenable,
it is unlikely that they derive much support from Davis. The basic
issue in each of those situations is not the "factuality" of the
question involved, but the extent to which the federal policy admits
of intervention by the state. But the policy behind the Court's
reference to the presumption of constitutionality in Davis was that
of affording an adequate remedy to workmen, not that of granting
full scope to state legislation.
The same is true of the Court's reference to the principle of
administrative finality as a justification for its decision. The
Court was not furthering a policy of giving scope to the deter-
mination of the administrator, but a policy of affording compen-
sation. That policy would be frustrated if the administrator were
to take the finality language seriously and deny compensation in
some of the twilight zone cases that came before him.75
"4 Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 587 ('95') (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.) (jury, not judge, should decide whether clear and present danger
presented by the defendants' conspiracy).
"7 Compare O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), with
Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944).
